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Abstract
Research on international election observation shows that observation reduces fraud,
encourages participation, and boosts confidence in the election. However, this conven-
tional account misses the negative, violence-inducing potential of observer criticism.
This is the first study examining how observer criticism influences post-election vio-
lence. Democracy depends on the loser’s consent, and the willingness of election losers
to be governed by the winners can be influenced by observer criticism. When reputable
observers criticize the credibility of an election, they can encourage losers to challenge
the result. Observer criticism strengthens the electoral loser by legitimizing a challenge
and serving as a focal point for mobilization. Using data on post-election violence in 38
countries in sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, I show that internationally condemned elec-
tions are more likely to turn violent than not-condemned elections. These results are
robust to various control variables (including observer presence and election fraud) and
to accounting for potential selection, spuriousness, endogeneity, and omitted variables.
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Borzyskowski is the author of The Credibility Challenge: How Democracy Aid Influences
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Jon Pevehouse, Thomas Risse, Scott Straus, Michael Wahman, and to numerous audiences,
including at ISA, EPSA, and European Peace Science.
Virtually all countries today hold elections and most invite international observers to
attend and judge their election credibility. Scholarship on election monitoring largely docu-
ments the positive effects of observers (Hyde 2007; Donno 2010 and 2013; Hyde and Mari-
nov 2014; Flores 2012) while neglecting the potentially violent consequences of observer
criticism. Outbreaks of violence followed negative observer verdicts on several elections,
including Panama (1989), Cameroon and Mauritania (1992), Togo (1998), Nigeria (1999),
Ethiopia (2005), Kenya (2007), Ivory Coast (2010), and Gabon (2015). So far, though, no
study has examined the effect of observer criticism on election violence. While the criticism-
violence effect is sometimes assumed to be established (Luo and Rozenas 2017), previous
work examines the effect of observer criticism on protest (which may or may not be violent;
Hyde and Marinov 2014) and the effect of observer presence and election fraud (Daxecker
2012; Smidt 2016). However, we do not know whether observer criticism drives violence.
In particular, several major theoretical and empirical questions remain unanswered: is post-
election violence the result of observer condemnation, observer presence, or election fraud?
Further, how do elections derail after observer criticism: who has incentives to act on a
negative observer verdict, and can we document this mechanism?
In this paper, I argue and show empirically that observer condemnation contributes to
post-election violence. By issuing a negative verdict (i.e., alleging significant vote fraud),
international monitors cast doubt on the credibility of the election. Such condemnation
provides election losers legitimacy to challenge the election result and facilitates mobilization
among the loser’s supporters. Since more people are likely to come out and support the loser,
the loser’s chances of winning a potential post-election contest are heightened, thus making
the loser more likely to challenge the result. Challenges by the electoral loser make it more
likely that violence erupts. This paper specifies and tests the effect of observer criticism on
post-vote violence and the mechanism of loser challenge.
I document the potentially violent consequences of observer condemnations, and disen-
tangle the effect of observer criticism from the effects of observer presence and election fraud.
I leverage data on post-election violence in 38 sub-Saharan Africa countries since 1990 in
statistical analyses and a comparative case study. The analyses demonstrate that interna-
tional condemnation can increase the risk of post-vote violence. Conditional on international
observers attending, condemned elections are substantially more likely to be followed by vi-
olence than not condemned elections, especially in developing democracies. This result is
robust to different fraud measures, a range of other controls, and to accounting for potential
selection bias, omitted variables, endogeneity, and spuriousness. The effect of condemnation
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on post-vote violence is not simply driven by fraud; observer criticism exerts an additional,
substantial effect. Fraud alone is less likely to lead to violence than “internationally certified
fraud.” Further, I document why condemnations increase the risk of violence: condemnations
increase the risk that the loser will challenge the election results, which in turns makes vi-
olence more likely. Finally, I compare two similar elections (Kenya and Sierra Leone 2007),
where different observer verdicts contributed to divergent outcomes. Taken together, these
findings offer strong support for the argument that international condemnations can facilitate
post-vote violence, and thus have negative side effects.
This paper identifies a key dilemma facing election observers who have hard evidence
about manipulation. Observers can either endorse the fraudulent election, acting against
their own mandate, or condemn it and risk violence. While observer groups do not aim to
trigger violence, I show that their critical verdicts can contribute to unrest and instability.
I disentangle the potential factors of observer criticism, observer presence, and fraud; I
also outline policy implications for how observer groups may deal with this dilemma in
practice. This paper addresses the unintended negative consequences of IOs for domestic
politics, elections, and democracy promotion.1 By highlighting an international influence
on post-vote violence, the paper moves beyond existing work on election violence, which
is largely focused on domestic politics (fraud, competition, economics, civil war; see Flores
and Nooruddin 2012; Bekoe 2012; Taylor, Pevehouse, and Straus 2017). About a quarter of
elections worldwide are affected by electoral violence, which is often employed as a tool of
political competition (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014, 151; Fischer 2002, 11).
Existing Research on Observation and its Effects
International election observation has become widespread, with most developing coun-
tries inviting observers to monitor and assess their election’s quality. Observer organizations
vary in their reputability, which derives from their capacity to detect and their willingness
to condemn manipulation (neutrality). Reputable observer groups invest more in the mon-
itoring effort (e.g. number of staff and days present in country, being more systematic and
professional) and are more likely to issue impartial assessments. Neutrality is highest for
groups that are “disinterested third-party observers without a stake in the outcome of the
election” (Hyde and Marinov 2014, 339).
1Other IO side effects are documented for human rights (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006),
civil war (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 2010), and rule of law (Simpser and Donno 2012).
2
External observer groups are credible sources of information because they tend to be more
neutral and nonpartisan than domestic or regional actors.2 Domestic groups can have ad-
vantages in terms of larger staffing capacity and more local knowledge (Hyde 2011; Nevitte
and Canton 1997). However, domestic groups may be less neutral in their assessments
of elections because individual citizen observers and aggregate citizen groups usually have
strong predispositions and a direct stake in the election outcome; they are not disinterested
(Nevitte and Canton 1997, 50). Further, domestic groups can be more easily intimidated,
curtailed, and their statements dismissed as having a pro-opposition bias.3 Non-Western
groups (i.e. regional membership organizations such as the African Union) are generally
less neutral in their assessment because regional organizations are funded by member state
governments, whose policy priorities may override democracy promotion. In addition, the
level of democracy in regional member organizations (such as the African Union) is often
mixed and relatively low, which makes these organizations less “vested in upholding elec-
toral norms” (Kelley 2009, 770). This means regional organizations are not disinterested
but instead tend to be biased in favor of governments, and at times rubber-stamp prob-
lematic elections (Institute for Security Studies 2017). Non-Western groups rarely condemn
elections.4
Reputable observer groups include – but are not limited to – the European Union (EU),
the Carter Center (CC), the Commonwealth Secretariat, the National Democratic Institute
(NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), and International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES) (Carothers 1997, 21-22; Hyde 2011, 170; Hyde 2012, 40, 45, 50; Hyde and
Marinov 2014, 343; Kelley 2012, 52-53, 120). That is, previous research deems “reputable”
and “Western” as largely synonymous (Kelley 2009, 769-770; Hyde and Marinov 2012, code-
book variables nelda46 and nelda47). I follow this convention and focus on reputable observer
groups and criticism by such reputable groups.
Existing research has reached considerable agreement that external election observation
overwhelmingly improves governance in host countries. External observers can detect and
deter fraud (Alvarez et al. 2008, 211; Hyde 2007), increase participation of opposition
2Hyde and Marinov 2014, 339. For the same reasons, observers are more credible than
non-observers such as governments, journalists, and foreign diplomats/individuals.
3Bjornlund 2004; Hyde and Marinov 2014, 338; Hyde 2011, 53. In line with this reasoning
about domestic groups, Bush and Prather (2018) find that international observer verdicts
can change election credibility, whereas domestic observers did not.
4I control for the presence of domestic and non-Western groups in the robustness checks.
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parties (Bjornlund, Bratton, Gibson 1992, 408; McCoy, Garber, Pastor 1991, 109), encourage
voter turnout (McCoy, Garber, Pastor 1991, 107), boost confidence in the announced result
(Garber and Cowan 1993; McCoy, Garber, Pastor 1991, 112-113), and help raise the quality of
current and future elections (Donno 2013, 101-104; Kelley 2012, 129, 154).5 Previous studies
have examined which elections are more likely to be observed (Hyde 2011; Kelley 2012), to
be fraudulent (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009; Hyde 2011, chapter 5; Hyde and O’Mahoney 2010;
Schedler 2002; Simpser 2013; Simpser and Donno 2012), or to be condemned (Kelley 2009
and 2012). I build on insights from these previous studies, but shift the focus to a different
aspect of the situation: namely, domestic reactions to observer statements.6
Shortly after voting, observer organizations issue press statements and reports about the
credibility of the electoral process and by implication its result. Observer press statements
have become a media spectacle, with observer groups usually rushing for attention around
election-day.7 International observers “maintain excellent contacts with international news
media” (Hyde and Marinov 2014, 338). Domestic and international media eagerly attend
observer press conferences and disseminate observer verdicts widely. Local, national, and
international newspapers, radio, and other mass media (social media and television) also
disseminate observer statements. Observer verdicts are well known among domestic actors,
and “many domestic audiences such as opposition political parties cite observer reports as
credible evaluations of the quality of elections” (Hyde 2012, 41). The vast majority of critical
reports reach mass audiences in the host country. Data indicate that in 93% of condemned
elections, reports critical of the government’s handling of the election reached large numbers
of people.8
5Some have raised caveats about the extent of these positive effects (Kelley 2012, 168-
169; Carothers 1997, 20-27) and noted strategic adaptation by the incumbent (Simpser and
Donno 2012; Ichino and Schündeln 2012; Hyde and O’Mahony 2010).
6I account for factors driving observation, condemnation, and whether elections are fraud-
ulent in the empirical analyses.
7I document this in Appendix Figure A1 on the timing of reports.
8Variable nelda28 from Hyde and Marinov 2012. In the remaining 7% of elections, it is
either unclear or the critical report did not reach large numbers. One example is Equatorial
Guinea in 2008, which was an autocratic regime in which domestic media was heavily biased.
I control for the level of democracy and whether critical reports reached the mass public in
the main analysis and robustness checks.
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When monitors issue negative verdicts, they allege that the election was marred by serious
fraud and thus violated democratic standards. Recent studies point to the positive effects
of such condemnations: they make external enforcement of democratic norms more likely
(Donno 2010, 615-616), they create moments of potential democratic revolutions (Beissinger
2007, 263), and they also increase the likelihood of protests (Chernykh and Svolik 2015, 417;
Hyde and Marinov 2014, 329) which potentially helps self-enforcing democracy.
Yet regardless of protests’ eventual fate, protests come at a price. Post-election protests
often result in violence, especially in developing countries (Beaulieu 2014, 92). If condem-
nations also contribute to post-vote violence, then their effects can be detrimental to demo-
cratic stability and domestic peace. Some research has hinted at a condemnation-violence
link (Kelley 2009, 771; Hyde 2011, 8) or assumed it as given (Luo and Rozenas 2017) but
this link has not been systematically documented until now.
Systematically examining the violence-boosting potential of observer criticism is a cor-
rective to existing research. Attitudinal studies on two elections have shown that observer
criticism makes electoral losers more likely to believe the election result was not credible
(Robertson 2017; Bush and Prather 2017); yet whether and how that translates into be-
havior remains an open question. Two other studies have shown that observer presence at
fraudulent elections can increase the number of conflict events (Daxecker 2012; Smidt 2016).
Sometimes it remains unclear whether conflict events are violent or election-related.9 More
importantly, while the studies point to the theoretical importance of observer criticism, nei-
ther study empirically examines observer criticism.10 Instead, these studies examine observer
presence at manipulated elections, which is not the same as observer condemnation. This is
highlighted by the fact that fewer than half of flawed, observed elections are condemned.11
9Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) data used in Smidt’s study include non-
violent events, such as vandalism and newspaper raids (Smidt 2016, 232), which are not
necessarily generating fatalities or injuries. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
(ACLED) data do not allow objectively filtering out electoral from other forms of violence,
such as non-electoral protests, militia fights over territorial control, and peace campaigns.
For another discussion of election violence data, see Taylor, Pevehouse, and Straus 2017,
401-403; and von Borzyskowski and Wahman 2019.
10Daxecker (2012, footnote 25) states that observer fraud reports are not measured. Smidt
(2016, 232-33) uses identical data.
11Only 41 percent of observed elections with serious fraud are condemned by observers.
Author’s calculation based on the fraud measure used in these articles, i.e. State Department
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Thus, observer presence at flawed elections is not a proxy for observer condemnation or
observer criticism.
This article distinguishes the effect of observer condemnation from observer presence and
election fraud. It therefore differs from most research on post-vote conflict in its explicit
focus on observer statements rather than their mere presence, and whether negative verdicts
– issuing critical statements about election quality – influence election violence. Moreover,
I theorize and document the mechanism by which observer condemnations can trigger post-
vote violence. Electoral losers and how they choose to respond to a negative verdict are
crucial to understanding when and why post-vote violence occurs.
The Risk: Violent Consequences of Condemnations
Democracy depends on the loser’s consent. An often substantial portion of citizens who
are displeased with the election outcome must agree to be governed by the winner rather than
challenge the result. Election losers are critical because they “decide whether to fight on” or
comply with adverse results (Riker 1983, 62; Przeworski 1991, 15; Nadeau and Blais 1993,
553). Election losers have incentives to challenge election results and risk or incite violence
because they have the most to gain from a change in the status quo of political leadership.
In contrast, the winner usually has few incentives to challenge election results or resort to
force without a provocation. Note that the electoral loser can be either the incumbent or
the opposition.12 While it is possible for political leaders and supporters to disagree about
the best path forward, leaders in many African elections have a strong influence and a party
youth wing to implement violence when instructed (Laakso 2009, 231-232, 243-244; Mehler
2007, 204-206; Makumbe 2002, 91; Masunungure 2011, 55-57). In the case of the incumbent,
the means of violence also include police and military.
The loser’s consent has become habitual political behavior in advanced democracies,13
Human Rights reports, which frequently reference US and non-US criticism and are issued
up to a year after the election (see Daxecker 2012, 510; Smidt 2016, 232-233; data from
Kelley 2010 QED).
12I return to this issue in the research design. The incumbent loses one in five African
elections. The risk of post-vote violence is not significantly different in those cases; author’s
calculation based on data from Nelda and AEVD, described below.
13In the rare cases where election results are contested in advanced democracies, challenges
usually take the form of legal proceedings (e.g. US 2000).
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but in many nascent democracies this is not the case. Here, losers constitute a “weak link in
the chain of stable democratic governments” and the usual winner-loser gap in perceptions
of legitimacy is wider (Anderson et al. 2005, 109, 101-104). In Africa in particular, losers
often denounce elections and are less inclined to consent to government authority. (Lindberg
2006, 48; Moehler 2009, 345). Yet many elections remain peaceful, even in less democratic
countries. Why does violence erupt after some elections but not others?
I propose an explanation centered on the role of international observer reports. Elec-
tion observers can strengthen the loser by issuing a negative verdict, i.e. casting doubt on
the credibility of the election. While the wording of negative reports varies, they mostly
allege significant fraud and state one of the following:14 “elections have fallen short of key
international and regional standards for democratic elections;” “significant manipulation” or
“evidence of widespread manipulation.” The IO observer’s decision to condemn an election
usually requires substantial evidence that egregious manipulation has occurred (Carothers
1997, 23-25; Hyde 2012, 53). Consequently, when reputable IO monitors do condemn elec-
tions, this public statement is a strong signal of manipulated results. Observer reports of
fraud play an important role beyond fraud itself because reports provide information, reduce
uncertainty about the level of fraud and incumbent popularity, tend to be more reliable than
domestic allegations of fraud, and reach wide sections of the population (Chernyk and Svolik
2015; Hyde and Marinov 2014).
Condemnation by a reputable observer group can contribute to violence. One critical
report can fuel violence (by increasing the loser’s incentives to challenge the result), even
when other observer groups disagree. This builds on previous work which showed that
“criticism by one internationally reputable group is usually sufficient to cast doubt on the
quality of the process,” serve as a focal point for collective action, and legitimize post-election
protests (Hyde and Marinov 2014, 337, 343). Politicians focus on and/or highlight observer
statements that support their perspective (Kelley 2012, 48, 164; Kelley 2009, 62; Hyde and
Marinov 2014). Complexity (or having multiple and sometimes conflicting reports) means
that competitors get to pick the verdict that most supports their case. This implies that
condemnations should be associated with more violence, regardless of whether other observer
groups disagree.15
Condemnations strengthen the electoral loser in two ways: (1) by revealing that the
14These are examples from negative observer reports in the sample; similar examples can
be found in Hyde 2011, 111.
15I assess this in the robustness section.
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true level of the loser’s popular support is likely higher than the official election result
suggests, and (2) by serving as a focal point for mobilization among the loser’s supporters.
First, an international condemnation indicates that the loser is likely stronger than the
officially announced result suggests. Since manipulation is usually in favor of the winner,16
this suggests that the losing candidate’s actual vote share and support are higher than the
official results. Popular strength at the ballot box and in the street are linked “in the sense
that people who vote for a party are also more likely to fight for the same party” (Londregan
and Vindigni 2006, 25; Chacon, Robinson, and Torvik 2011). Vote shares reflect an actor’s
popularity and capacity, and thus indicate the potential for mobilization (Bunce and Wolchik
2010; Magaloni 2010).
Second, a condemnation can serve as a focal point for coordination and help crystallize
support behind the loser in favor of overturning the result. Although supporters prefer
standing by their candidate, their individual cost of rebellion potentially involves violence
and state repression, which need to be weighed against the probability of success. Thus from
the supporters’ perspective, judging the legitimacy of the potential challenge is critical. An
international verdict helps supporters distinguish between political cheap talk and the truth.
The exposure of fraud can change an individual’s calculus about participating in rebellions
(Tucker 2007; Przeworski 1991). In particular, exposure of fraud can facilitate mobilization
by lowering individual’s cost of punishment and increasing the likelihood of success (Kuntz
and Thompson 2009, 256-257; Kuran 1995, 247). A negative IO report shifts the candidate’s
probability of winning a post-election fight in favor of the loser by increasing the number of
people who are willing to fight for the loser. If the loser is more likely to win a potential
fight, the loser is more likely to risk a fight by challenging the result.
International condemnations can help electoral losers solve collective action problems.
The loser’s camp may then (1a) initiate violence or (1b) initiate peaceful protests (verbal,
legal, in the streets), which can lead to (2) the winner cracking down and initiating violence.17
I argue that condemnations increase the risk of a loser challenge, contributing to violence
16Most manipulation is executed by incumbents and most incumbents win elections.
Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 412; Simpser 2013, 76; Beaulieu and Hyde 2009, 400-402.
17Empirical example cases include respectively: (1a) Kenya 2007; (1b) verbal announce-
ment in Nigeria 2003; legal proceedings in Uganda 2011, Zimbabwe 2002, Cameroon 1992;
loser peaceful street protest in Niger 1996, Equatorial Guinea 1999, Cameroon 1997; and
(2) winner repressing the loser’s peaceful protests in Ethiopia 2005, Togo 1998, Mauritania
1992.
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through one of two main scenarios. Either the loser’s challenge is peaceful and the winner
reacts violently to that challenge; or the loser’s challenge itself is violent, and the winner
reacts to that challenge violently. Empirically, both sides are often engaged in post-election
violence.18 Concededly, it makes a difference whether losers turn violent or whether winners
attack peaceful protesters. However, in the second scenario winners tend to react to the
initial loser challenge, which itself would have been less likely without a condemnation.
Regardless of the stage at which violence breaks out, the overall risk of violence should
be higher after condemned elections. Consequently, I argue that condemnations encourage
losers to challenge the result, which can then become violent.19 Taken together, I expect
that condemnations increase the risk of post-vote violence. Observer criticism exerts an
additional effect on violence, beyond the mere presence of observers or election fraud. Thus
the following is the hypothesis that I test as the key observable implication.
Hypothesis: International condemnation increases the likelihood of post-election
violence.
This hypothesis stands in contrast to alternative expectations about no effect or a
violence-reducing effect. Some might think that condemnation may lower post-election vio-
lence because condemnation possibly generates higher international attention that (a) might
make the winner less likely to use violence, and (b) might make the loser think that the in-
ternational community will step in and thus might make violence less necessary.20 However,
this seems unlikely for two reasons. First, it is unclear why the winner would be less likely
to use violence after condemnation. The winner has already been publicly shamed (con-
demned) for significant interference in the election. Moreover, if incumbents significantly
manipulate elections, they likely value office holding more than the potential cost of inter-
national shaming. Both suggest that adding more shaming should not alter the behavior of
winners. Second, losers are unlikely to believe that the international community might step
18Of all cases with post-election violence in the AEVD data (from Straus and Taylor 2012,
described below), the incumbent is a major perpetrator in 94%; the opposition is a major
perpetrator in 44% and in an additional 25% the opposition is a minor perpetrator, for a
total of 69%. I thank Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor for sharing these data with me.
19For empirical evidence of the link between condemnations, loser challenge, and violence,
see Supplementary Files, Tables A4 and A5.
20I thank a reviewer for raising this point.
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in after condemnations because outside interventions to overturn election results are exceed-
ingly rare. In only 7% of elections did an outside actor attempt to influence the election
outcome (variable nelda58 from Hyde and Marinov 2012) and most of this influence occurs
before voting takes place (Bubeck and Marinov 2017, 537). Furthermore, even if outside
intervention after voting were to take place, it would likely encounter opposition by other
international powers, as different interveners might support different candidates (Risse and
Babayan 2015; von Soest and Wahman 2015). While a violence-reducing effect thus does
not seem likely, it nonetheless serves as a potential counter-argument to the main hypothesis
proposed here, i.e. that condemnation facilitates post-election violence.
Research Design
I test the hypothesis using data from 1990 to 2008 for national elections in 38 countries in
sub-Saharan Africa. The unit of observation is national elections, which includes legislative,
presidential, and general elections. This geographic region is suitable for several reasons. A
cross-national analysis of sub-Saharan Africa allows me to compare countries with a similar
trajectory because most of them transitioned to multi-party rule in the early 1990s. The
region also offers significant variation in both the dependent variable (violence) and the key
independent variable (condemnation). Further, as a practical matter sufficiently granular
data exist on Africa to test my argument here.21
The main dependent variable is electoral violence (physical force) in the three months
after each national election.22 Post-election violence is 1 if at least one election-related fa-
tality occurred. This can take the form of assassination (i.e. at least 1 death) combined
with long-term high-level arrests of party leaders, the consistent use of violent harassment
or torture; or it can take the form of widespread physical attacks resulting in more than 20
deaths (Straus and Taylor 2012, 21-22; Taylor, Pevehouse, and Straus 2017 - African Elec-
toral Violence Database, AEVD). The variable is zero when no fatality was reported and
for minor harassment short of violence (e.g. police breaking up rallies, street brawls, oppo-
sition newspapers being confiscated, candidate disqualifications). Unless noted otherwise, I
21Other data do not measure violence (but protest, conflict), do not distinguish the elec-
toral dimension of the violence (but capture general civil conflict), or do not distinguish
violence before versus after election-day.
22The three-month period is standard in studies on post-election conflict (Daxecker 2012;
Straus and Taylor 2012, 19-20; Smidt 2016; von Borzyskowski 2019).
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estimate binary logit models with robust standard errors clustered by country to adjust for
the lack of independence of elections within the same country.
In addition to examining the main effect – that of condemnation on post-election violence
– I also assess the plausibility of steps in the proposed causal chain, involving loser challenges.
Recall that the loser can be either the incumbent or the opposition, so that the proposition
should be tested with data on loser challenges. The variable loser challenges is coded 1 when
some or all electoral losers rejected the election result or consented only after substantial
delay. Consenting only after substantial delay is coded as a loser challenge because the results
of the election are challenged for some time (often several weeks) before the loser consents,
which leaves a substantial window of time for protests, unrest, and violence to emerge. It is
coded 0 when all main players immediately accepted the announced result, i.e. right after
results are announced.23
The key independent variable is international condemnation in the form of a negative ob-
server report or press release. This variable is a binary indicator coded 1 when any reputable
IO observer group seriously questioned the process or outcome of the election.24 Following
prior research, reputable IO observers are operationalized as Western groups, including the
European Union (EU), European Parliament, the Carter Center, the National Democratic
Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), Commonwealth Secretariat, and
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).25
To distinguish the effect of observer criticism from observer presence, I include the vari-
able IO observers present. This is coded 1 when Western IO monitors observed the election
and 0 otherwise (variable nelda46). Based on this variable, I analyze two sets of elections: (i)
the full universe of elections, controlling for observer presence and (ii) the restricted sample
of observed elections. The latter offers a more stringent, cleaner test of the argument because
only those elections are included in the analysis which “qualify” for observer condemnation
in the first place.
To distinguish the effect of observer fraud reports from fraud itself, I include indicators of
23Data from Lindberg 2006; the shorter temporal coverage reduces the number of obser-
vations.
24I use variable nelda47 from Hyde and Marinov 2012, which has been used previously for
the same purpose (Hyde and Marinov 2014).
25When controlling for conflicting reports by multiple attending Western groups or any
observer groups, results are qualitatively similar; see Supplementary Files, Tables A6-A7.
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fraud on and before election day.26 Since fraud is not perfectly observable, I use six alternative
measures of fraud to capture presence and severity from multiple sources. This includes a
measure of concerns before the elections that elections will not be free and fair, which captures
fraud expectations and is not influenced by observer reports or other aspects known after
election-day.27 The four-point scale fraud election-day level measures no, minor, moderate,
and major issues with vote fraud or intimidation, while the binary variable fraud election-day
dummy specifically indicates major problems.28 Since the source of these particular variables
ends in 2004 (reducing sample size), I supplement missing values from fraud election-day
dummy with more recent data on major vote fraud and intimidation29 to generate the variable
serious fraud. In the robustness checks, I use three additional fraud measures for the period
before elections and overall manipulation; the results are quite similar.30
A first look at the raw data provides tentative support for the hypothesis that the risk
of post-election violence is significantly higher after condemnations. Figure 1 shows the
rate of post-election violence for observed elections in 38 sub-Saharan African countries
between 1990 and 2008. Figure 1 panel (a) is a bivariate comparison between violence and
condemnation. It illustrates that 25 percent of all condemned elections experienced violence
afterwards but only 6 percent of elections turned violent when they were not criticized by
international observers. This difference of 19 percentage points is statistically significant.31
Figure 1 panels (b) and (c) show that the violence gap exists regardless of whether serious
26For fraud and post-election mobilization, see Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Tucker 2007.
27See prior fraud concerns in model 2 of Tables A9-A10. This is a cleaner measure than
some of the other fraud variables, which may be influenced by aspects known after the
election, including observer reports.
28Kelley 2010, QED sr21cheat, which is based on U.S. State Department human rights
reports. While State Dept reports provide a useful measure of election fraud (and are thus
used in this analysis), they cannot cause violence in the immediate post-election period
because State Dept reports are written and published in the year after the election. Using
separate dummies for the different levels shows that major fraud is the aspect most associated
with violence.
29Beck et al. 2001. This is a binary indicator recording “whether vote fraud or candidate
intimidation [were] serious enough to affect the outcome of elections” (DPI 2012, 17).
30See Supplementary Files, Tables A9 and A10.
31Difference of proportions test yields p=0.00.
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fraud occurred: post-vote violence is between two and seven times more likely to follow
condemned than non-condemned elections.32 Even in the absence of serious fraud, the effect
of a negative report is substantively important, doubling the risk of post-election violence.
This initial comparison suggests that condemnations and post-election violence are strongly
related.












































































In addition to fraud, I control for several other election-level variables which prior re-
search has identified as correlates of post-election conflict, such as vote shares and opposition
boycotts (Arriola and Johnson 2012, 41; Beaulieu 2014, 73). Loser’s vote share is the per-
centage points for the runner-up, according to official election results.33 I expect greater
32Difference of proportions test yields p=0.02 in the case of serious fraud.
33Data from Carr 2012; Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut 1999; African Elections
Database. For general elections I use presidential results; for two-round elections I use sec-
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popular support for the loser to increase the loser’s incentives to challenge results and thus
increase violence risks. In addition, more popular losers might also face more government
crackdown in reaction to the challenge or as an attempt to prevent it. A binary control for
opposition boycotts is included, which should also be positively associated with post-election
violence when dissatisfaction from the campaigning period spills over into the post-election
phase (variable nelda14). The models also control for pre-election violence level, a four-point
scale of election-related violence in the six-month campaigning period before elections.34
Lastly, poll type distinguishes between legislative (0), executive (1) and general elections
(2).35
The models also include a range of country-level controls to account for context and
remote causes of violence. These are leader tenure and executive constraints36 which influence
conflict dynamics (Krieger 2005; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014; Fearon and
Laitin 2003). The models also include GDP per capita for economic development (Collier
2009, 20-21)37 and natural resources per capita for unearned oil and gas income (Ross 2012;
Fearon and Laitin 2003).38 Population size39 and ethnic fractionalization are included as
demographic controls (Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson 2007; also see Wilkinson 2004). All
of these country-level controls are lagged by a year so that they are not contemporaneous
with the outcome and to mitigate endogeneity.40 Finally, post conflict measures whether the
country experienced civil conflict in the previous ten years.41 Descriptive statistics for all
ond round results. Results are qualitatively similar to using the loser’s seat shares instead
of vote shares.
34AEVD previolev; results are qualitatively similar with a binary variable.
35AEVD type. Elections occurring within three months of each other are collapsed to one
observation because it is difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish whether electoral violence
relates to one or another temporally close election.
36Data are from Beck et al. 2001 (logged); Marshall and Jaggers 2011.
37Measured in constant USD and logged. See World Bank 2012.
38Logged value of oil and gas production to a government once subsidies are accounted
for.
39Measured in millions and logged. World Bank 2012.
40Follow-up analyses also account for potential endogeneity; see below.
41Gleditsch et al. 2002, (internationalized) internal armed conflict. Using alternative
specifications of the time period (one and five years after civil war) does not affect results.
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variables are in Table A1 in the Supplementary Files.
Results
Table 1 presents the estimated impact of condemnation on post-election violence. The
results consistently support the main argument. The coefficient on condemnation is positive
and statistically significant in all models (p < 0.05). Columns 1 through 3 are estimated
on all elections, so that the counterfactual to condemnation includes both other42 observer
verdicts and unobserved elections; I control for whether monitors were present. The mere
presence of observers by itself is not a significant predictor of post-vote violence. This casts
doubt on the assumption that the mere presence of monitors, on average, may reduce post-
election violence (Luo and Rozenas 2017). Columns 4 through 6 offer a more conservative,
cleaner test of the hypothesis since the sample is restricted to observed elections only. Here
the counterfactual to condemnation is non-negative observer verdicts (i.e. positive and mixed
reports). Throughout all models, observer condemnation is associated with a significantly
higher risk of post-election violence.43
If condemnations (negative reports) can exacerbate violence, an interesting question is
whether endorsements (positive reports) can deter violence. Recall that the counterfactual
in models 4-6 includes both positive and mixed reports, so we cannot infer from Table 1
whether endorsements have any effects. To assess this possibility, I use supplementary data
to code the variable endorsement, i.e. clearly positive reports (not negative or mixed observer
verdicts). I replicate Table 1 with endorsement instead of condemnation.44 This reveals that
endorsement is associated with less violence but the estimates are based on a much smaller
sample of elections (due to data availability) so that results remain suggestive.
The effect of condemnations is also substantively important. Figure 2 shows changes in
the predicted probability of post-election violence when condemnation is varied from 0 to 1 in
42Condemnations are significantly different from other verdicts; see Supplementary Files
page 2.
43Robustness checks replace the violence measure (based on AEVD) with alternate out-
come measures (SCAD and ACLED). The results are substantively similar. The coefficients
on condemnation are positive in all models and statistically significant in most models. De-
tails are in the Appendix pages 5-7, Appendix Tables A4 and A5.
44Data from Kelley 2010, DIEM data, variable a1. Table not shown but code included in
the replication file.
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Table 1: Effect of Condemnation on Post-Election Violence
All elections Observed elections only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Condemnation 2.934*** 3.335** 3.157** 3.621*** 6.570** 6.964**
(0.914) (1.475) (1.575) (1.321) (2.765) (3.201)
Election controls
IO observers present -0.407 -1.058 -0.985
(1.054) (1.097) (1.142)
Serious fraud 1.764** 1.223
(0.828) (0.806)
Fraud election-day dummy 2.135** 1.799
(0.945) (1.697)
Fraud election-day level 1.219** 0.891*
(0.548) (0.468)
Loser’s vote share 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.085*** 0.105*** 0.169 0.165*
(0.023) (0.029) (0.030) (0.034) (0.117) (0.094)
Boycott 0.873 1.608 1.483 1.850 6.541 6.838*
(1.255) (1.670) (1.560) (1.355) (4.080) (3.543)
Poll type 0.032 0.601 0.584 -0.238 1.751*** 1.891***
(0.625) (0.592) (0.662) (0.860) (0.515) (0.668)
Pre-election violence level 0.059 0.039 -0.201 -0.116 -0.369 -0.661
(0.557) (0.659) (0.894) (0.579) (0.544) (0.658)
Country controls
Leader tenure (log) 0.713** 1.018*** 0.927** 0.777 1.116** 0.968**
(0.333) (0.378) (0.454) (0.524) (0.520) (0.443)
Post conflict -1.528 -1.649 -2.014 -1.059 0.297 0.002
(1.369) (2.363) (2.184) (1.425) (1.849) (1.790)
GDP pc (log) -1.021 -1.204 -1.062 0.043 1.192 1.329
(0.816) (0.959) (0.872) (0.671) (1.093) (1.099)
Natural resources pc (log) 0.025 0.116 0.104 -0.056 -0.028 -0.025
(0.089) (0.100) (0.109) (0.097) (0.121) (0.115)
Executive constraints 0.379 0.521 0.696* 0.340 0.802 0.887
(0.349) (0.354) (0.371) (0.519) (0.720) (0.728)
Population size (log) -0.916 -1.160 -1.149 -0.821 -1.532* -1.656*
(0.634) (0.749) (0.844) (0.776) (0.787) (0.967)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.424 -3.272 -2.511 2.297 1.690 1.985
(2.488) (2.337) (2.479) (3.557) (3.880) (5.255)
Constant 0.039 2.481 -0.562 -10.142* -24.216 -25.702
(6.243) (7.637) (5.975) (5.952) (16.403) (15.857)
Observations 151 114 114 109 83 83
Number of countries 38 37 37 35 34 34
Percent correctly classified 94.70 94.74 94.74 96.33 96.39 93.98
ROC 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.95 0.96
Pseudo R2 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.49 0.49
AIC 81.77 67.16 65.91 65.17 49.98 50.01
BIC 127.03 108.20 106.96 102.85 83.85 83.88
LL -25.89 -18.58 -17.96 -18.59 -10.99 -11.01
Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
two fraud scenarios. When reputable monitors observe and condemn elections, the risk of a
violent aftermath increases by 46 percentage points when election day was marred by serious
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fraud and 17 percentage points when it was not fraudulent.45 This effect is substantively
important, as it represents a large shift in conflict risk and also exceeds the fraud effect.
To compare the two effects, note that changes in serious fraud without a condemnation (5
percentage points) and with a condemnation (34 percentage points) are smaller than changes
in condemnation (17 and 46 percentage points).
Figure 2: Substantive Effect of Condemnation on Post-Election Violence
Figure 2 shows that the effect of observer condemnation on violence obtains regardless of
election-day fraud and that the effect is smaller – but still substantial – when no such fraud
occurred. Condemnations based on manipulation other than election-day fraud, e.g. the
absence of a “level playing field” even before elections, are less likely to trigger violence. This
is in line with the mobilization mechanism, since the attenuated effect is mainly driven by one
type of political regimes: electoral autocracies. While countries in the group “condemnation
with election-day fraud” have a variety of regime types, the group “condemnation without
election-day fraud” is populated by countries which are almost all autocracies (e.g. Zimbabwe
2002, Uganda 2001 and 2006, Comoros 1996). Electoral autocracies stand out in two ways:
45Predicted probabilities are based on column 1 with control variables set to means/modes
(i.e. observers present =1) and are calculated using Clarify (King, Tomz, Wittenberg 2000).
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they tend to frontload fraud to the pre-election period (so that serious election-day fraud
is no longer necessary) and repress opposition movements (e.g. by limiting freedoms of
expression and association).
The attenuated effect in electoral autocracies is consistent with the mobilization mecha-
nism outlined above: for losers to challenge the result in the streets, they must have some
potential for collective action and some prospect of success. However, in autocracies incum-
bents tend to win and the losing opposition usually stands little chance of either mobilization
or successful turnover. The power disparity in electoral autocracies is so great that losers
usually dare not violently challenge the regime (anticipating overwhelming state repression),
and winners rarely need to use violence in reaction. Rather, loser challenges tend to take the
form of verbal announcements, court petitions (as in Uganda 2001-2011 and Cameroon 1992)
or peaceful demonstrations.46 These strategies tend to be countered by the winner through
judicial decisions or short-term arrests, rather than escalating into months of fighting between
two similarly powerful groups. Therefore, condemnations’ effect on post-election violence is
weaker in electoral autocracies than in other contexts (mainly developing democracies).
While the results support the argument that observer condemnations can contribute
to violence, I do not claim that condemnations determine violence, are the single cause
of violence, or that they are always the primary driver of conflict. Domestic variables –
underlying, sometimes long-term conditions – are also important. Fraud, the loser’s vote
share, and leader tenure are statistically significant and positively associated with violence.
Further, in the subset of observed elections, executive and general elections are more prone
to violence (likely because of the higher stakes), and those held in somewhat more populous
countries are less prone to violence. The remaining control variables have no consistent
effects.47
The data also support the importance of loser challenges in the causal chain linking
observer condemnations and violence. While my main interest is establishing the effect of
condemnation on post-vote violence – and distinguishing it from the effects of observer pres-
ence or fraud – supplementary data are sufficiently granular to also examine the plausibility
46After Ethiopia’s condemned 2005 election, the losing opposition challenged through
peaceful demonstrations, which then met government crackdown; more than two-hundred
people died.
47Campaign violence does not emerge as a significant predictor. This matches other re-
search showing that pre- and post-election violence are two different phenomena, operating
under distinct logics (Taylor, Pevehouse, and Straus 2017, 398, 406, 408-409).
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of the intermediary step in the causal chain and allow inferences about the behavior of the
key actor, i.e. whether the electoral loser is more likely to challenge a result when it is
condemned, which then triggers violence. Simple bivariate comparisons show that condem-
nations are associated with a 25 percentage point higher rate of loser challenges, and loser
challenges in turn are associated with a 9 percent higher rate of post-election violence. These
bivariate differences are statistically significant. For the multivariate analysis, I replicate Ta-
ble 1 but replace the outcome variable with loser challenge. Table A2 in the Supplementary
Files shows that condemnations are significantly associated with a higher risk of loser chal-
lenges, controlling for a range of other factors. That is, observed elections are significantly
more likely to be challenged when they were condemned by observers. Loser challenges, in
turn, are significantly associated with increased violence (p < 0.01), as shown in Table A3 in
the Supplementary Files. In terms of substantive importance, loser challenges are associated
with a 12 percentage point increase in post-vote violence.48 These results support the causal
chain outlined in the theory section, i.e. that condemnations increase the loser’s incentives
to challenge results, and that loser challenges increase the risk of violence after elections.
Alternative Explanations
The results support the argument that condemnations can contribute to post-election
violence. However, it could be that the relationship is an artifact of selection, reverse cau-
sation, or spuriousness (e.g. simply driven by fraud). First, the relationship might be an
artifact of selection. If observer groups attend more volatile elections, their condemnation
would reflect these problems but such elections would have been violent independent of the
condemnation. To explicitly test this concern, I use two-stage estimations, which model
observer presence based on prior research (Hyde 2011, 77; see notes for Table A14 in the
Supplementary Files). Heckman sample selection models show that even after controlling
for potential observer selection, the results hold (see Table A11 in the Supplementary Files).
In a different two-stage setup, I also test more explicitly whether observers tend to select
into or withdraw prematurely from more violent elections but find no empirical support for
these selection issues (see Tables A12-A13 in the Supplementary Files).
Another selection concern is that observer criticism is not random. Monitors often couch
their concerns diplomatically and only condemn an election when they have hard evidence
48Based on model 2 of Table A3 in the Supplementary Files with all variables set to their
means and modes.
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(Carothers 1997, 23-25; Hyde 2011, 110-112). Also, observers might be less likely to condemn
if they think the propensity for post-election violence is high (Kelley 2012, 72-73). The latter
logic should make it harder to find the effects that I find in Table 1 because it would mean
that condemnations would be less likely in the most violence-prone elections. Nonetheless,
the endogeneity of condemnations is worth addressing. I thus replicate model 4 of Table
1 but allow condemnations to be endogenous to several factors identified in prior research
(Kelley 2012, 198; see notes for Table A14 in the Supplementary Files), including fraud and
pre-election violence. The first stage is whether a negative report is issued, and the second
stage is identical to the main analyses. The results show that even when accounting for the
drivers of condemnation, condemnation remains significantly associated with a higher risk
of violence (Table A14 in the Supplementary Files).
A second concern is that causality might be reversed. One can imagine a scenario in which
monitors hold off on their verdict, violence erupts after elections, and this already occurring
violence would lead monitors to condemn the election. I examine this possibility in two
ways: with original data on sequencing and with a statistical analysis of reverse causality.
As above, I replicate model 4 of Table 1 and allow condemnations to be endogenous to a
number of factors (Kelley 2012, 198; see notes for Table A14). The results show that the
null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected (see large p-values for H0 in Table A14).
And, as mentioned before, even when accounting for potential endogeneity, condemnation
remains significantly associated with a higher risk of violence.
Original data on the temporal order of events also cast doubt on reverse causality. I
collected data on the timing of IO reports and the announcement of provisional results in
relation to election-day. In order for post-election violence to influence observer reports,
the reports need to be issued several days, perhaps weeks after the election to allow time
for announced results and responding violence. Yet Figure A1 in the Supplementary Files
displays a different story: the vast majority of IO reports are issued within 1-2 days immedi-
ately after voting, sometimes even before or on the day of polling itself. Further, IO verdicts
almost always precede the announcement of results. When losers challenge results, they tend
to wait for results to be announced, which usually takes several days or weeks after voting.
Verdicts tend to be announced more quickly (often late on election day or within a couple
of days after voting). This makes it difficult for verdicts to be influenced by post-election
violence.49 Thus the weight of the evidence discounts endogeneity concerns.
49This is consistent with non-African examples where election losers hold off their decision
to protest until after the observer verdict. Hyde and Marinov 2014, 352-53.
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A third concern is spuriousness: fraud or other pre-treatment covariates may influence
both condemnations (treatment) and violence (outcome). To address this concern, I em-
ploy genetic and coarsened exact matching on all observed elections (Diamond and Sekhon
2013; Iacus, King, and Porro 2012). The idea behind matching is to reduce imbalance on
pre-treatment confounders between treated and control groups, thus reducing bias in the
estimated treatment effect, and approximating a randomized experiment. Matching allows
us to compare elections that are effectively similar across a range of structural factors that
influence violence but differ in whether or not they have been condemned by reputable ob-
server groups. Matching relies on the assumption of “ignorable treatment assignment.” While
this assumption cannot be directly tested (Stuart 2010, 15), it is reasonable in this context,
I include pre-treatment covariates to reasonably satisfy it, and assess through sensitivity
analysis how violating it would affect conclusions. Matching also has limitations (potentially
increasing imbalance and only matching on observables; King and Nielsen 2016). A detailed
discussion of assumptions (and how they are satisfied) and limitations (and how they are
mitigated) is in the Appendix on pages 23-25.
For genetic matching, I first estimate the probability of an election being condemned
based on prior research, generating a propensity score.50 Then, elections are matched on this
propensity score and all the variables from above (Table 1 model 4) to predict the effect of
condemnation on post-election violence. A diagnostic plot (Appendix Figure A3) documents
that genetic matching improves covariate balance on all covariates, with differences becoming
insignificant between treated and control observations in the matched data. In addition, all
standardized differences are smaller than 0.25, a rule-of-thumb for good balance (Stuart
2010, 11-12, 15). The estimated average treatment effect on the treated is 0.35 with a
standard error of 0.14, which is again statistically significant, positive, and comparable in
size to the main result.51 I also use coarsened exact matching (CEM) as alternative; the
results are quite similar and detailed in the Appendix. The matching analyses suggests
that there is a statistically significant, positive average treatment effect of condemnations
on post-election violence. When accounting for potential spuriousness, the main result holds
up. Since the matching process pairs elections with similar characteristics, this suggests that
condemnations do not simply reflect “bad” elections which would have resulted in violence
50Again based on Kelley (2012, 198) and as in the endogeneity test on Table A14 model
1 stage 1; see notes for Table A15 in the Supplementary Files.
51The list of matched pairs is in Table A15. The interpretation is unchanged when using
more fine-grained data or also matching on incumbent loss; see Appendix pages 25, 28.
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regardless of condemnation. As noted before, fraud alone is less likely to lead to violence
than “internationally certified fraud.”
Finally, concerns about omitted variables often remain with observational data and with
matching procedures. The main analysis (Table 1) includes a rich set of control variables
and follow-on analyses add further controls (Tables A6-A9, A10, A16-A18 in the Supple-
mentary Files). For example, it is possible that opposition coalitions during the election
or the strategic importance of the country may unduly drive results, so robustness checks
include relevant measures as further control variables.52 Other robustness checks control for
whether it is the first election monitored by reputable groups (which might be different),
whether domestic observers were also present, and restricts attention to only those condem-
nations that reached the mass public. These tests do not change the substantive result.53
Nonetheless, it remains possible that unobserved confounders unduly bias the estimated ef-
fect of condemnation on post-election violence. To assess the robustness of the estimates to
the presence of omitted variables, I run sensitivity analyses as developed by VanderWeele
(2011). The proposed method assumes that some binary variable is omitted from the model
used to estimate the effect of condemnation on post-vote violence. The biasing variable
may represent some underlying country propensity for social conflict or other unobserved
or unobservable factors. The sensitivity analysis is detailed in the Supplementary Files and
results are illustrated in Figure A4 in the Supplementary Files. The results suggest that the
estimates are robust to strong levels of bias arising from unobserved or unobservable factors.
This makes it unlikely that bias from unobserved covariates is fully driving the impact of
condemnation on violence.
While any individual robustness test is perhaps not convincing in and of itself (as all
modeling approaches have underlying assumptions and weaknesses) the variety of different
tests – with results pointing in the same direction – increase confidence in the main finding.
Case Comparison: Sierra Leone vs. Kenya 2007
52Specifically, I control for British or French colonial ties, voting affinity with the US in
the UN General Assembly, and aid per capita. Data are sourced from the ICOW Colonial
History Data Set; Graham and Tucker 2017; Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017. Results
are in Appendix Table A19.
53Data are sourced from nelda46, V-Dem, nelda28. Results are in Appendix Tables A20-
22.
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This section compares two elections to illustrate the mechanism linking condemnations
and violence, i.e. increasing the loser’s incentives to challenge the result by (i) indicating
that the loser has more popular support than the official result suggests and (ii) providing
a focal point for mobilization. The pair of cases – Kenya vs. Sierra Leone 2007 – is drawn
from the matching analysis (Table A15). Thus the elections were effectively similar along
the structural variables influencing post-election violence: both were general elections with
4-8 years of leader tenure, low pre-election violence, serious fraud, and about 45% vote share
for the loser. In addition to these control variables, the two elections were also similar
in other respects. Both countries were former British colonies and gained independence
in early 1960s, followed by periods of dominant-party rule and then (again) multi-party
elections in 2002. Both countries were presidential systems and had a history of coups and
experience with violence in previous elections, as well as substantial ethnic diversity and
ethnicity as a relevant factor. While the comparison is not perfect, it is certainly instructive.
Since the two elections were effectively similar along the control variables (see Table A23
in the Supplementary Files) and other dimensions, alternative explanations have limited
explanatory leverage for why Sierra Leone remained peaceful while Kenya erupted in intense
violence. If anything, we might expect Sierra Leone to be more violent due to its civil war
history, lower development, and higher share of ethnically excluded population.
A crucial difference between the cases was the observer verdict: the EU endorsed the
election in Sierra Leone but condemned the one in Kenya. Tensions were high after Sierra
Leone’s presidential runoff, with ballot stuffing and disrupted vote counts leading to claims
of fraud, weapons movements, further mobilization of ex-combatants, and getting machetes
ready to attack opponents (Njanji 2007; Christensen and Utas 2008, 515, 536-537). The next
day, however, EU observers issued a preliminary statement endorsing the election result as
“generally well administered” (European Union 2007, 1, 7). This positive verdict confirmed
the credibility of the election result, an incumbent party loss.54 Weak domestically and
deprived of a condemnation to use as a rallying cry, the loser conceded defeat the same day
on which results were announced so that post-vote violence did not occur.
This stands in sharp contrast to Kenya’s election a few months later, which EU observers
condemned. This condemnation unintentionally helped embolden the loser to challenge the
result violently. In Kenya, some election officials initially kept local results secret, which
the EU chief observer criticized as “clearly disturbing” (Gettleman 2007a). Notably, the
54Incumbent loss is not significantly associated with post-vote violence in multi-variate
analyses (see Table A14) or bi-variate analyses (probability (chi2)= 0.74).
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EU observer group publicly condemned the election on December 30, before final results
were announced and before widespread violence erupted.55 Early on December 30, when
the results were “still up in the air,” the EU chief observer cast serious doubt on election
credibility noting the lack of transparency and suspiciously high turnout in some areas (Ibid).
As discussed in the theory section, one condemnation from a reputable observer (here the
EU) is often sufficient to contribute to violence. In fact, some say that the EU statement was
the “most damning” as it was “the largest international observer group, which documented
a number of startling verified irregularities” (Cheeseman 2008, 176). The EU, too, thinks
that its observer statements are “more influential in shaping perceptions” because the EU is
often the largest observation mission (Atwood 2012, 22).
The EU condemnation was repeated in several international media outlets on December
30, such as in South African Mail, New York Times, Irish Times. Kenyans could access
various international outlets and increasingly had to, as the government suspended live news
broadcast with the exception of a government-backed station (Kenya Broadcasting Corpo-
ration; see Rambaud 2008, 98). Observer condemnation reached broad sections of society:
“Popular vindication built up as more and more signs of manipulation were denounced by
ODM as well as European Union and Commonwealth observers, followed by local NGOs and
some ECK commissioners. News and rumors about the rigging sparked off events” (Lafargue
and Katumanga 2008, 14).
While other reputable observer groups eventually also criticized election quality, meaning
that observers were “near unanimous that vote counting in the 2007 elections was flawed”
(Gibson and Long 2009, 499), the EU was the first to criticize the election on December 30
(Gettleman 2007a; Gettleman 2007b)56 The EU re-iterated its criticism on December 31 and
January 1 (Gettleman 2007c; European Union 2008).
55Early unrest before December 30 was quite different from subsequent violence in mo-
tivation (protests against delaying the results), intensity (limited “scuffles” and property
damage), and geographic scope (Nairobi slums). This contrasts sharply with the intense and
widespread violence across the country that erupted after the condemnation and final results
announcement. See International Crisis Group 2008, 9; United Nations 2008, 8; Gettleman
2007a.
56The IRI, the Commonwealth, and other observer groups praised voting and first with-
held judgement on counting (see IRI, 28 December 2007). Later they also condemned the
election due to irregularities in counting. The IRI condemned the election on January 2;
Commonwealth and COMESA criticized it later in January.
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However, “despite the protestations of the ODM and the EU that irregularities in the
results had not been sufficiently investigated” the election commission declared Kibaki the
winner. (Cheeseman 2008, 176). When results were announced later on December 30,
supporters of the electoral loser (Odinga) immediately challenged them by attacking the
homes and businesses of the winner’s (Kibaki) supporters. The winner “tried to pre-empt
any [further] challenge by having himself hurriedly sworn in” (Human Rights Watch 2008,
22). Within a few hours, the EU chief observer followed up on the earlier EU criticism,
noted inconsistencies between local and national results, and stated that the tallying process
was not credible (Gettleman 2007b) so that “doubt remains as to the accuracy of the result
announced today” (Daily Nation 2007; European Union 2008, 1).
The observer condemnation made it more difficult to portray the opposition as sore losers.
The Kenyan press linked the observer condemnation directly to the loser challenge: Odinga’s
“charges of fraud were lent extra weight by the EU election monitoring team” (Daily Star
2008, Bosire 2008.) The loser called for mass protest, which the supporters were ready to
join (ABC Premium News 2008). Odinga supporters, even abroad, felt that that Odinga’s
decision not to accept the election was justified by observer criticism (Butty 2008). Foreign
observer criticism “strengthened the opposition in officially contesting the results without
offering an alternative” (Connan 2008, 329). The United Nations later noted that “based
on the findings of various observation missions and independent reports, however, it is clear
that procedural irregularities in the vote counting and tallying cast serious doubts on the
legality of the election results. Kenyan voters who did not support Kibaki and who felt they
had been deprived of their basic democratic rights then unleashed a wave of protests and
violence that engulfed the country for weeks” (United Nations 2008, 15). In short, it was
after observer criticism and the announcement of final results that the loser challenged the
result, unrest escalated and spiraled into widespread and intense violence across the country,
with over 1,000 fatalities and many more injured and displaced. While observer criticism
did not cause initial clashes over results delay, it contributed to the escalation of violence
after results announcement.
Furthermore, the EU later acknowledged the role that its negative report played: it
“may have reinforced the narrative (of a vote stolen by the election commission on behalf of
President Kibaki) which was driving violence” (Atwood 2012, 22). In addition to the EU, the
IRI observers also seemed to be aware of the condemnation-violence link.57 Odinga attached
57The IRI withheld its own exit poll, which showed the official “loser” (Odinga) winning.
It would likely also have contributed to a loser challenge of results and potentially fueled
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high value to observer findings. Regarding the IRI poll, Odinga said that “my [Odinga’s]
supporters believe that had IRI released those polls, they would have made a huge difference”
(McIntyre and Gettleman 2009). This shows that international observer statements are
important to the election candidates and the (announced) loser in particular. Thus, observer
condemnation exacerbated post-election violence in Kenya. Clearly, observer condemnation
mattered; it was one important factor – although not the only factor – contributing to
post-election violence.
Taken together, this evidence supports both parts of the mechanism. First, the EU’s
criticism of the election result suggested that Odinga’s popular support was larger than
Odinga’s official vote share. And second, this condemnation was an important factor con-
tributing to the narrative of a stolen election and thereby facilitating mobilization among
Odinga’s supporters.
Conclusion
Studies of international election monitoring have generally highlighted its positive effects,
and critical observer reports specifically have been lauded for increasing international pres-
sure for democratization and potentially stimulating domestic reform (Donno 2010; Hyde
and Marinov 2014). Yet the same observer condemnations can also trigger violence. A neg-
ative IO report can increase the electoral loser’s incentives to challenge results by indicating
that the loser’s popular support is larger than the official vote share and by providing a focal
point for mobilization. Loser challenges can themselves be violent or provoke reactionary
repression, resulting in violent intimidation and fatalities. These findings suggest that IO
observers may not have unequivocally positive effects, but can also have significant negative
side effects that contribute to violence.
This study documents for the first time the potentially violent consequences of observer
condemnations and disentangles the effect of observer criticism from the effects of observer
presence and election fraud. Previous work examined the effect of observer presence on
conflict, and the effect of observer condemnation on protest, which may or may not be
violent – but left unclear whether condemnation also drives post-election violence. Using
data on post-election violence for 38 countries in sub-Saharan African since 1990, the analyses
show that condemnation can increase the risk of post-vote violence. This finding is robust
to different samples, report nuances, different measures of fraud and other control variables,
violence; see McIntyre and Gettleman 2009.
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and to accounting for potential selection, omitted variables, spuriousness, and endogeneity.
The results show that condemnations can contribute to post-election violence, even after
controlling for a wide range of factors. I also draw on original data on the timing of IO
verdicts and results, data about loser challenges, and a comparative case study to trace the
dynamics in more detail. The analyses also provide support for the proposed causal chain,
i.e. that condemnations make loser challenges more likely, which in turn are associated with
more post-vote violence.
One question for future research is whether this dynamic is limited to Africa. As suf-
ficiently granular data on electoral violence become available for other regions, we can ex-
plore these dynamics systematically in other contexts. It is possible that the condemnation-
violence link is weaker outside of Africa because of higher strategic importance or stronger
democratic institutions. For example, countries in Latin America or the Middle East might
be seen as more strategically important (for the US or Europe), which could make observers
less likely to condemn elections or make preventive or crisis diplomacy more likely, leading
to a lower risk of post-vote violence. It is also possible that regions with stronger democratic
institutions – including more credible election commissions and higher quality elections –
have less uncertainty about election credibility, so that the added informational value from
election observers is lower. Future research is needed to systematically assess this dynamic
in other parts of the world, but several cases suggest that the argument’s logic might also
travel to other regions.
A purview of cases suggests that similar dynamics have also emerged in other regions.
For example, while Mexico’s 1994 election was hailed as a step forward, monitors criticized
the uneven playing field in terms of media coverage and financing. The electoral loser
(Cardenas) repeated this criticism almost verbatim as the motivation for challenging the
outcome (Fineman 1994). Panama’s 1989 election went sour when dictator Noriega’s favorite
candidate was trailing the vote count; Noriega replaced tally sheets and then annulled the
election. As international observer, former President Carter personally criticized this move,
and the opposition followed with mass protests the next day, at which the main opposition
leader (Endara) was severely beaten by paramilitary forces (NDI/IRI 1989, v, 79). In Jordan,
2010 was the first election to be criticized by international observers and also the first to
erupt in peaceful mass protests, with the government using tear gas to disperse crowds.
Similarly, Azerbaijan’s 2003 election was condemned by monitors and then challenged by
the losing opposition, leading to mass arrests and at least one fatality from clashes with the
police (Anderson et al. 2005, 6). Armenia’s 1996 election was followed by peaceful protests
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which turned violent after the OSCE condemned the elections (Bennett 1996). These and
other cases suggest that the conclusions also apply to some elections beyond Africa, but
more systematic analyses are needed.
Another interesting question is whether the political violence (or protests or revolutions)
that can result from condemnations can nevertheless contribute to democratization. While
rich literatures have emerged on democratization and political violence – as well as the role
of international actors in these domestic processes – they have largely developed independent
of one another. Whether and to what extent democratization actually ensues after election
violence or even non-violent protests is an open empirical question. Short of systematic
studies, election violence seems undesirable because peaceful elections are a cornerstone of
democracy, because short-term consequences of violence are rarely positive (such as lead-
ership or regime change), and because long-term consequences are usually detrimental for
legitimacy, development, and broader stability (Bratton 2008; Bekoe 2012).
From a policy perspective, the potentially negative consequences of condemnations have
important implications for international election assistance. Observer groups should – first
and foremost – fulfill their mandate, which is monitoring and publicly assessing the elec-
tion quality. Not doing so would defeat the observers’ purpose, diminish their value added,
and seriously call into doubt their long-term vitality. However, there might be ways to
mitigate the observer dilemma. First, IOs could avoid attending clearly undemocratic elec-
tions and explicitly state the reasons. While most reputable monitoring IOs have agreed
to avoid undemocratic elections (United Nations 2005, 4), this strategy has not been fully
implemented. “Elections” in Cambodia 2008, Azerbaijan 2010, Kazakhstan 2011, Cameroon
2011, Swaziland 2013, and Uzbekistan in 2014 were all observed by credible IOs. There was
little evidence before-hand that these elections would be fair. By attending elections which
have already been rigged in the pre-election period, observer groups risk lending legitimacy
to undemocratic processes.
Second, (more) observer groups could issue more frequent interim statements before
election day to lower the impact of a sudden condemnation. Instead of the first critical
statement “hitting” immediately after voting, when tensions are high, observer groups could
issue preliminary press statements regularly in the weeks leading up to polling. By slowly
adjusting expectations and reflecting political conditions as they evolve, the impact of the
condemnation might be lessened.
Third, donor agencies and democracy promotion IOs may be well advised to consider
a shift from observation to technical assistance for some elections. If violence breaks out
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because election results are not credible, then one solution is to strengthen electoral institu-
tions to support credible elections (von Borzyskowski 2019). Instead of expending resources
to establish that undemocratic elections were indeed not meaningful, donor organizations
could support reforms, such as strengthening election institutions, and conducting voter ed-
ucation. Since technical assistance (Ludwig 2004; von Borzyskowski 2016) does not publicly
judge election credibility, its potential for stirring unrest is lower. If anything, technical
assistance may help secure the loser’s consent or peaceful engagement by increasing the
credibility of the electoral process.
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